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COMMENTS 
Manageability of Notice and Damage Calculation 
in Consumer Class Actions 
It is precisely because the class action deters the robber barons 
from plundering the poor that it has been hailed as a very impor-
tant supplement to law enforcement. Take away the class action 
and the joy of those who live off the small consumer will, as in the 
bad old days, be unconfined.1 
The 1966 amendment of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 232 
I. Letter from Abraham L. Pomerantz to the Financial Editor, N.Y. Times, April 25, 
1971, § 3, at 22, col. 8. This letter was in response to an article by Milton Handler, 
Massive Class Actions: A Liability, N.Y. Times, April 4, 1971, § 3, at 12, cols. 3-8. See 
also Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovations in Antitrust Suits, 
26 REcoRD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 124 (1971), 71 CoLUM. L. REv. l (1971). A bibliography of 
selected materials on class actions is collected in 26 RECORD OF N.Y.C.B.A. 412 (1971). 
2. Amended Rule 23 was adopted by Order of the Supreme Court, 383 U.S. 1031 
(1966), along with additional amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on 
Feb. 28, 1966, effective July 1, 1966. Rule 23 presently provides: 
CLASS ACTIONS 
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue or 
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous 
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact 
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are 
typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will 
fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class. 
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action 
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition: 
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the 
class would create a risk of 
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members 
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the 
party opposing the class, or 
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which 
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members 
not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability 
to protect their interests; or 
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally 
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or cor-
responding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or 
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of 
the class predominate over any questions afjecting only individual members, and 
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: 
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution 
or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation con-
cerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; 
(C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims 
in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the 
management of a class action. 
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice; 
Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions. 
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brou~ht as a 
class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained, 
An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or 
amended before the decision on the merits. 
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was designed in large measure to fulfill the "historic mission of 
taking care of the smaller guy."8 It had been generally recognized 
that the classification of class actions according to jural relation-
ships4 under the former rule had become unworkable;5 the rule 
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall 
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circum-
stances, including individual notice to all members who can be identified through 
reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will 
exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, 
whether favorable or not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; 
and (C) any member who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an 
appearance through his counsel. 
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision 
(b) (1) or (b) (2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and describe 
those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The judgment in an action 
maintained as a class action under subdivision (b) (3), whether or not favorable to 
the class, shall include and specify or describe those to whom the notice provided 
in subdivision (c) (2) was directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and 
whom the court finds to be members of the class. 
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as a class 
action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided into subclasses 
and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this rule shall then be 
construed and applied accordingly. 
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which this rule 
applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the course of 
proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repetition or complication 
in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) requiring, for the protection of 
the members of the class or otherwise for the fair conduct of the action, that notice 
be given in such manner as the court may direct to some or all of the members of 
any step in the action, or of the proposed extent of the judgment, or of the oppor-
tunity of members to signify whether they consider the representation fair and 
adequate, to intervene and present claims or defenses, or otherwise to come into 
the action; (3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on int<:r-
venors; (4) requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allega-
tions as to representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accord-
ingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be combined 
with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may be desirable 
from time to time. 
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or com-
promised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed dismissal 
or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such manner as the 
court directs. 
3. Statement by Benjamin Kaplan, quoted in Frankel, Amended Rule 23 from a 
Judge's Point of View, 32 ANTITRusr B.J. 295, 299 (1966). See also Ford, Federal Rule 
23: A Device for Aiding the Small Claimant, IO B.C. IND. &: CoM. L. R.Ev. 501 (1969). 
4. Prior to the 1966 amendments, class actions under Rule 23 were classified ac-
cording to the character of the right sought to be enforced. These types of class 
suits became popularly known as true ("joint, or common, or secondary in the 
sense that the owner of a primary right refuses to enforce that right and a mem-
ber of the class thereby becomes entitled to enforce it"), hybrid ("several, and the 
object of the action is the adjudication of claims which do or may affect specific 
property involved in the action''), and spurious ("several, and there is a com-
mon question of law or fact affecting the several rights and a common relief is 
sought''). The label applied often determined jurisdictional requirements, the binding 
effect of the judgment, and the application of the statute of limitations. See Moore, 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Some Problems Raised by the Preliminary Draft, 25 
GEo. L.J. 551, 570-76 (1937); Moore &: Cohn, Federal Class Actions, 32 ILL. L. REv. 307 
(1937). 
5. Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial Conference of 
the United States, Advisory Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 98-99 (1966) [hereinafter Advisory 
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was- amended with the intention of elucidating in- more practical 
terms the proper occasions for maintaining a class action.6 Early suits 
brought under the amended rule concentrated in the antitrust and 
securities fraud areas,7 largely because an Advisory Committee Note 
appended to Rule 23 made specific mention of the likelihood that 
private antitrust damage suits and suits for fraud arising from a 
common misrepresentation would be properly maintainable as class 
actions.8 Recently, federal legislation has been proposed to provide 
more effective consumer0 remedies, and these proposals generally 
rely heavily upon the operation of Rule 23 for implementation.10 
This Comment will examine the likelihood that Rule 23, as it has 
been interpreted since its amendment, will provide a mechanism 
through which consumers may successfully resolve their grievances. 
The focus will be on the manageability problems of providing the 
requisite notice and of devising a method of calculation and dis-
tribution of damages. 
I. REQUIREMENTS OF RULE 23 
Subsection (a) of Rule 23 contains four necessary, but not suffi-
cient, conditions that must be fulfilled if a suit is to be properly 
maintained as a class action.11 These preconditions largely reflect 
criteria contained in the former rule.12 However, while under the 
former rule the binding effect of a judgment was largely determined 
by the jural relationship involved,13 it was thought that since the 
Note]; Z. CHAFEE, SoME PROBLEMS OF EQUITY 244-58 (1950); Kalven &: Rosenfield, The 
Contemporary Function of the Class Suit, 8 U. CHI. L. REv. 684, 702-07 (1941). 
6. Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 99. See also Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: 
Some Problems in Class Actions, 9 BUFFALO L. REv. 433 (1960). 
7. 2 W. BARRON &: A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 562, at 76 
(C. Wright ed., Supp. 1970); 3B MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 11 23-45(2], at 758 (2d ed. 
1969) (hereinafter MooRE]; C. WruGllT, FEDERAL COURTS § 72, at 312 (2d ed. 1970); 
7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL§ 1781 (1972). 
8. Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 103. 
9. The term "consumer" will be used in its broadest sense throughout this Com• 
ment. It will generally be the case that class actions are maintained when the damages 
suffered by individuals are an insufficient inducement to the assertion of legal rights 
and that only by forming a class and sharing litigation expenses does suit become 
feasible. Additionally, consumer class actions will ordinarily have at their roots con• 
tractual transactions from which actions for breach of contract or for related torts 
(e.g., fraud) arise. See Starrs, Continuing Complexities in the Consumer Class Action, 
49 J. URBAN LAw 349 (1971). 
10. E.g., S. 984, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (Consumer Class Action Act of 1971); 
H.R. 1078, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. (1971) (amendment to the Federal Trade Commission 
Act). Both proposals provide that the federal courts shall have original jurisdiction in 
actions brought under the proposed statutes. On the general topic of possible legislative 
approaches, see Leete, The Right of Consumers To Bring Class Actions in the Federal 
Courts-An Analysis of Possible Approaches, 33 U. PITT, L. REv. 39 (1971). 
11. See note 2 supra. See also Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 100. 
12. 2 w. BARRON&: A. HOLTZOFF, supra note 7, § 562, at 63; MOORE, supra note 7, 
1J 23.02-03, at 201; 7 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, supra note 7, § 1759. 
13. See note 4 supra and accompanying text. 
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amended rule contempl<!,ted broader res judicata application,14 the 
courts would apply more demanding standards to assure that the 
class was properly and adequately represented.15 The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals, the first federal appellate court to consider the 
adequacy of representation under the amended rule, required only 
that the class be represented by competent counsel and that the pos-
sibility of a collusive suit between the litigants be eliminated as 
much as possible.16 Similar standards have been applied in other 
cases.17 The other criteria prescribed in Rule 23(a) are either not 
often challenged by the defendant18 or are so similar to other re-
quirements that must be satisfied that courts analyze them in con-
nection with other subdivisions of the rule.19 
Subsection (b) of Rule 23 describes the additional elements that 
must be satisfied in order to maintain a class action.20 An action 
must meet the requirements of one of the three categories of sub-
section (b). Class actions may be brought under Rule 23(b)(l) when 
their use will eliminate undesirable effects that might result from 
nonclass suits brought by or against individual members of the class. 
Actions brought under this subsection might well be classified as 
"protective" class actions, with subsection (b)(l)(A) designed to pro-
tect the party opposing the class and subsection (b)(l)(B) providing 
for a class action when the rights of class members not parties to the 
original action might otherwise be jeopardized. Subsection (b)(l)(A) 
provides that a class action may be brought when the prosecution 
of separate actions creates a risk that incompatible standards of con-
duct might be established for the party opposing the class. The 
examples suggested by the Advisory Committee-the invalidation 
14. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)-(3), set out in note 2 supra. The Advisory Committee 
realized that the court conducting the action could not predetermine the res judicata 
effect of its judgment, but noted: 
The court, however, in framing the judgment in any suit brought as a class action, 
must decide what its e.xtent or coverage shall be, and if the matter is carefully 
considered, questions of res judicata are less likely to be raised at a later time 
and if raised will be more satisfactorily answered. 
Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 106. See also C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 72, at 314. 
15. MooRE, supra note 7, -;[ 23.02-03, at 202; 7 C. WRIGHT &: A. MILLER, supra note 7, 
§ 1765; Eisen v. Carlisle &: Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562 (2d Cir. 1968). 
16. Eisen v. Carlisle &: Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 562-63 (2d Cir. 1968). 
17. E.g., Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), revd. on other 
grounds, 438 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1971); Mersay v. First Republic Corp., 43 F.R.D. 465, 
468-71 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
18. E.g., City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971) (im-
practicability of joinder); Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 379 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (typical claims 
or defenses). 
19. E.g., Vernon J. Rockier &: Co. v. Graphic Enterprises, Inc., 52 F.R.D. 335 (D. 
Minn. 1971) (common questions of law or fact); Koehler v. Ogilvie, 53 F.R.D. 98 (N.D. 
Ill. 1971) (adequacy of representation and typical claims combined in analysis). See 
generally Donelan, Prerequisites to a Class Action Under New Rule 23, IO B.C. IND. 
&: CoM. L. REv. 527 (1969). 
20. See note 2 supra. 
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of bond issues or the duties of riparian owners21-are very different 
from the issues involved in the typical consumer class action. 
Accordingly, one commentator has urged that actions for money 
damages should not qualify under subsection (b)(l)(A) because the 
payment of damages to members of a class does not create the "in-
compatible standards of conduct" within the meaning of that limita-
tion: 
This phrase implies that the separate judgments will affect an op-
posing party's continuing course of conduct brought into issue by the 
suits and not that the judgments will cause inconsistent isolated 
actions. In the damages example, the payment or nonpayment of 
money damages are single inconsistent actions which may not affect 
the party's continuing course of conduct.22 
Furthermore, to the extent that a consumer class action is brought 
under the premise that consumers are financially unable to prosecute 
their grievances individually, the corresponding risk that individual 
suits would establish incompatible standards of conduct is reduced.28 
Subsection (b)(l)(B) permits a class action when a judgment in 
a nonclass action involving a member of the class would as a prac-
tical matter jeopardize the interests of class members not parties 
to the suit. Except in limited instances when claims are made by 
many persons against a fund insufficient to satisfy all claims,24 dam-
age claims are unlikely to qualify under subsection (b)(l)(B). There-
fore, consumer class actions are unlikely to fall within the param-
eters of either the subsection (b)(l)(A) or (b)(l)(B) provisions.2r; 
A class action under subsection (b)(2) arises when "the party 
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally 
applicable to the class."26 A subsection (b)(2) suit is appropriate 
when the remedy applicable is "final injunctive relief or correspond-
ing declaratory relief."27 While the subsection does not provide 
that damages may never be sought or awarded, the Advisory Com-
mittee was careful to state that a subsection (b)(2) action was not 
appropriate when "the appropriate final relief relates exclusively 
or predominantly to money damages."28 It is clear that this provision 
21. Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 100. 
22. Sabbey, Rule 23: Categories of Subsection (b), 10 B.C. IND. &: Coll!. L. R.Ev. 539, 
540-41 (1969). 
23. Eisen v. Carlisle &: Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 1968), criticized in 44 
N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 198, 201-02 (1969). 
24. See Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 101. 
25. See Travers &: Landers, The Consumer Class Action, 18 KAN. L. R.Ev. 811, 823-24 
(1970). 
26. See note 2 supra. 
27. See note 2 supra. 
28. Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 102. 
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was designed primarily to allow class actions in the civil-rights field, 
and although the Committee expressly states that a subsection (b)(2) 
suit is not limited to civil-rights cases,29 one commentator has urged 
that it should be so limited.80 Although a consumer class action 
could conceivably be brought seeking injunctive relief, it is far more 
likely that consumer actions will seek primarily monetary recoveries 
since the economic justification for a class action procedure is based 
on the idea that only by forming a class are consume~ likely to bring 
suit to recover the small damages that they individually have suffered. 
If, as in the case of civil-rights actions, a particular consumer cause 
can generate public donations to support a legal action,81 then a sub-
section (b)(2) suit seeking injunctive relief could be maintained upon 
the requisite showing that the adverse party had acted on grounds 
generally applicable to the class, but otherwise few consumer class 
actions will be permitted under Rule 23(b)(2). 
Therefore, despite an early prediction that not many subsection 
(b)(3) actions would be permitted,82 the vast majority of consumer 
class actions are likely to be brought under this subsection. The court 
must make two threshold determinations in order to allow such 
a suit. First, it must determine that questions of law or fact com-
mon to the members of the class predominate over individual 
questions.33 In the securities and antitrust fields, this requirement 
has generally been met in favor of the class by holding that the 
issue of liability arising from a common misrepresentation or a con-
spiracy predominates over the individual damage issues.84 Often the 
courts proceed to order a single trial to determine liability and sep-
arate trials to establish damages incurred by individual members. 85 
A warning by the Advisory Committee that a fraud case may be 
unsuitable for treatment as a class action when material variations 
in the representations and degrees of reliance exist86 may explain 
the reluctance of courts to allow class actions in consumer fraud 
cases.37 A recent California case suggests, however, that the com-
29. Id. 
30. Note, Proposed Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REv. 629, 648-49 
(1965). 
31. See Weinstein, supra note 6, at 435. 
32. Wright, Recent Changes in the Federal Rules of Procedure, 42 F.R.D. 552, 567 
(1966). For a later contrary conclusion, see Travers & Landers, supra note 25, at 824. 
33. See note 2 supra. It is at this stage that the court usually examines Rule 23(a)(2). 
See note 19 supra and accompanying text. 
34. E.g., Alameda Oil Co. v. Ideal Basic Indus., 326 F. Supp. 98 (D. Colo. 1971); City 
of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971); Siegel v. Chicken 
Delight, Inc., 271 F. Supp. 722 (N.D. Cal. 1967); Brennan v. Midwestern United Life 
Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 673 (N.D. Ind. 1966). 
35. See FED. R. Crv. P. 23(c)(4), set out in note 2 supra. 
36. Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 103. 
37. Kirkpatrick, Consumer Class Litigation, 50 ORE. L. REv. 21, 31-34 (1970); Smit, 
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monality of fact ·may be supplied by the showing of a pattern of 
misrepresentation.38 Although there may be difficulties in bringing 
consumer class actions for fraud, in many other consumer areas the 
necessity of showing a predominance of common questions is not 
likely to be determinative. 
The court must further determine under subsection (b)(3) that 
a class action is superior to other methods of fair and efficient 
adjudication of the controversy. The rule suggests four pertinent 
matters to be examined in making this determination,30 the most 
important of which is an assessment of "the difficulties likely to be 
encountered in the management of a class action."40 The other re• 
quirements of subsections (a) and (b)(3) have generally been inter-
preted favorably for those seeking a class action, and the assessment 
of difficulties in managing the suits reflects the final, and yet most 
substantial, hurdle faced by class action advocates. It is only recently 
that courts have found it necessary to focus directly on the manage• 
ability limitations to class actions as the other more preliminary 
objections raised by defendants have gradually been resolved in 
favor of maintenance of class actions. 
Since the federal rule was amended in 1966, commentators and 
courts have forecast that a substantial burden would be placed on 
the court system as an increased number of class actions would be 
maintained.41 In Snyder v. Harris,42 the Supreme Court cited the 
expansion of the federal caseload43 when it considered whether the 
amended federal rule had changed the then prevailing rule that 
plaintiffs may aggregate only commonly held claims or rights44 in 
satisfying the minimum jurisdictional amount in controversy.46 In 
holding that the amendment to Rule 23 did not change the inter-
pretation of the phrase "matter in controversy" for jurisdictional 
purposes and that separate and distinct claims could not be aggre-
Are Class Actions for Consumer Fraud a Fraud on the Consumer?, 26 Bus. LAW. 1053, 
1061-63 (1971). 
38. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 811-13, 484 P.2d 964, 971-72, 94 Cal. 
Rptr. 796, 803-04 (1971). 
39. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3)(A)-(D), set out in note 2 supra. 
40. FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3)(D), set out in note 2 supra. 
41. Frequently this assertion is supported by citation to a recent volume of Federal 
Rules Decisions showing the large number of class actions reported. See, e.g., Dole, 
The Settlement of Class Actions for Damages, 71 CoLUM. L. REV. 971 n.l (1971). No 
comprehensive statistical analysis has yet been made of the actual impact of the 
amended rule on the federal caseload, but it is nevertheless clear that many courts 
proceed on the assumption that the impact of the rule has been significant. 
42. 394 U.S. 332 (1969). 
43. 394 U.S. at 339-40. 
44. 394 U.S. at 335-36. See also C. WrucHT, supra note 7, § 72, at 315. 
45. 28 u.s.c. § 1332 (1970). 
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gated, the Court resorted to the jural relationships that had prevailed 
under the former rule, thereby resurrecting a classification that the 
amended rule had sought to bury.46 Most class actions brought under 
either subsection (b)(l) or (b)(2) will meet federal jurisdictional 
standards through compliance with the traditional aggregation re-
quirements47 or alternative jurisdictional provisions.48 However, 
most suits sought to be maintained as class actions under Rule 23 
(b)(3), which generally arise in the consumer context out of sep-
arate but similar transactions, will be denied since the rights asserted 
are "several" and aggregation is precluded.49 Commentators have 
called for statutory modification to allow aggregation in class ac-
tions, 60 and the Snyder decision has been the impetus for proposed 
federal legislation to eliminate the requirement of a minimum 
amount in controversy in certain consumer areas.51 
There is little question that Snyder represents a partial defeat 
of the purpose of the amended rule.52 But those who argue that Rule 
23 is ineffective for consumer class actions because of the limitations 
imposed by Snyder and the inadequacy . of state class action pro-
cedures53 have overlooked the significant areas in which jurisdic-
tiqnal amounts in controversy need not be demonstrated and have 
failed to foresee the impact of the federal rule upon the states. At 
least ten states now have rules substantially identical to the amended 
federal rule,54 and additional states that generally follow the federal 
46. See 394 U.S. at 343.44 (Fortas, J., dissenting). 
47. By the nature of the rights involved in Rule 23(b)(l) suits, the action is likely 
to fall within the meaning of common and undivided rights for which aggregation is 
permitted. See C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 72, at 315-16. 
48. 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1970), which grants jurisdiction in civil-rights cases without 
regard to an amount in controversy, is likely to cover most Rule 23(b)(2) suits. See text 
accompanying notes 27-30 supra. 
49. See Clark v. Paul Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939). 
50. E.g., C. WRIGHT, supra note 7, § 72, at 316. 
51. See note 10 supra. 
52. Kaplan, A Prefatory Note, 10 B.C. IND. &: CoM. L. REv. 497, 497-98 (1969); Note, 
Aggregation Doctrine Continues To Limit Class Actions, 24 Sw. L.J. 354 (1970); Note, 
Federal Courts and Procedure-Aggregation of Claims in Class Actions, 37 TENN. L. 
REv. 103 (1969); Note, Taxpayer Suits and the Aggregation of Claims: The Vitiation 
of Flast by Snyder, 79 YALE L.J. 1577 (1970). Cf. Maraist & Sharp, After Snyder v. Harris: 
Whither Goes the Spurious Class Action?, 41 Miss. L.J. 379 (1970). 
53. For discussions of the various forms that class actions may take and specific 
state provisions, see Homburger, State Class Actions and the Federal Rule, 71 CoLuM. 
L. REv. 609 (1971); Starrs, The Consumer Class Action-Part II, Considerations of 
Procedure, 49 B.U. L. REv. 407, 424-63 (1969). 
54. ARiz. R. C1v. P. 23 (Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. Supp. 1971); CoLO. R. CIV. P. 23 
(Colo. Rev. Stat. 1970); DEL. R. CHANCERY Cr. 23 (Del. Code Ann. 1971); IND. R. TRIAL 
P. 23 (Ind. Ann. Stat., Burns Supp. 1970); MINN. R. C1v. P. 23 (Minn. Stat. Ann. 1968); 
MoNT. R. CIV. P. 23 (Mont. Rev. Code Supp. 1971); Omo R. CIV. P,23 (1 Jacoby Ohio 
Civ. Practice 1970); S. DAK. R. CIV. P. 15-6-23 (S. :Oak, Comp. Laws-Supp •. 19.71); T.eNN. 
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rules are likely to amend their class action rules. Furthermore, state 
courts often look to the federal rules for direction, notwithstanding 
the language of their own class action statutes.66 In the many class 
actions that still will be brought on the federal and state levels, it is 
the problem of manageability that will question the effectiveness of 
the class action as a meaningful device for consumers. The problem 
challenges the ingenuity of the courts to develop a method of 
handling class actions that will redress valid consumer grievances. 
In those jurisdictions that follow the amended federal rule, the 
analysis of manageability is clearly suggested by Rule 23(b)(3)(D), 
but in all jurisdictions with any form of class action, the assessment 
of manageability should be an implicit and frequently controlling 
determination. Particular attention should be given to the problems 
inherent in providing notice in Rule 23(b)(3) actions and in cal-
culating and distributing damages. 
II. ILLUSTRATIVE MANAGEABILITY PROBLEMS-RECENT CASES 
The difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of 
large class actions are illustrated by two recent federal district court 
cases. Both decisions focus on anticipated problems of manageability, 
with one decision upholding a consumer class action and the other 
rejecting it. In Eisen v. Carlisle & ]acquelin,66 an investor brought 
an action against the two major odd-lot dealers on the New York 
Stock Exchange alleging that they had conspired and combined to 
monopolize odd-lot trading and had charged excessive fees in viola-
tion of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. 67 In a separate count, the plain-
tiff also charged the New York Stock Exchange with breach of the 
duties prescribed by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.68 Eisen 
sought to represent himself and all odd-lot purchasers and sellers 
between 1962 and 1966, a group estimated initially at 3.75 million 
investors59 and later determined to approximate 6 million.00 In 
response to defendants' motion under Rule 23(c)(l) that the class 
action not be permitted, the district court held that the plaintiff 
had not demonstrated that he could adequately represent the class 
R. CIV. P. 28 (Tenn. Code Ann. Supp. 1970); WASH, R. C1v. P. 28 (Wash. Rev. Coclc 
1968). 
55. See, e.g., Daar v. Yellow Cab Co., 67 Cal. 2d 695, 708-09, 438 P.2d 782, 742, 68 
Cal. Rptr. 724, 734 (1967). 
56. 41 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y.), motion to dismiss interlocutory appeal denied, 870 F.2d 
119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967), revd. and remanded 011 the merits, 
391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), decided, 52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
57. 15 u.s.c. §§ 1-2 (1970). 
58. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f(b), 78f(d), 78s(a} (1970). 
59. 41 F.R.D. at 151 n.2. 
60. 52 F.R.D. 253, 257 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
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as required by Rule 23(a)(4); nor that he would be able to comply 
with the notice requirements of Rule 23(c)(2); nor that common 
questions predominated over individual issues of law or fact as 
required by Rule 23(b)(3).61 Although the court refused to certify 
the class action, it did not dismiss the action in so far as it related 
to Eisen's individual claims, and it made no ruling on the merits 
of the allegations.62 
Eisen appealed the refusal by the district court to certify the 
class action. The defendants unsuccessfully moved to dismiss the 
appeal on the ground that the order had not been final because 
the plaintiff was still able to pursue his individual claim. 63 There-
after, in a widely noted decision,64 the Court of Appeals for the 
Second Circuit reversed the district court's holding. The court of 
appeals found that common questions did indeed predominate 
over individual issues despite the defendants' arguments that the 
class of purchasers and sellers of odd-lot shares had diverse motives 
and interests. It remanded the case for a determination of the ade-
quacy of representation and a resolution of the notice problems 
and further directed the district court to consider the mechanics 
involved in the administration of the action. The court carefully 
stated: "However, we do not express any opinion on this subject 
[of administrative feasibility] and we simply note that other courts 
in similar cases have been able to set up formulas of procedure for 
recovery that are applicable to an entire class."65 Chief Judge 
Lumbard dissented, arguing that the impossibility of proper notice 
and the unmanageability of the suit precluded a class action.66 
On remand, after an additional hearing that directed the parties 
to submit further data,67 Judge Tyler-who had made the deter-
mination five years earlier that a class action was not maintainable-
made detailed finding-s of fact based on submissions by the parties. 
Specifically, he found: (a) approximately 6 million shareholders had 
odd-lot transactions during the period in question; (b) the average 
shareholder had approximately 5 odd-lot transactions during this 
time, with an average odd-lot differential per transaction of $5.18; 
( c) of the 6 million shareholders, 2 million could be identified 
61. 41 F.R.D. at 150-52. 
62. 41 F.R.D. at 152. 
63. 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966). See generally Note, Interlocutory Appeal from 
Orders Striking Class Action Allegations, 70 CoLUM. L. R.Ev. 1292 (1970). Cf. Note, 
Civil Procedure-Finality of Determination Under Federal Rule 23(cX1), 48 N.C. L. 
REV. 626 (1970). 
64. 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), noted in 18 AM. U. L. REv. 225 (1968), 44 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 198 (1969), and 44 NOTRE DAME LAw. 151 (1968). 
65. 391 F.2d at 567. 
66. 391 F.2d at 570-72. 
67. 50 F.R.D. 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). 
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through a correlation of the defendants' records with computer tapes 
maintained by 14 of the largest brokerage firms; 68 (d) the names 
and addresses of the remaining two thirds of the class could not be 
identified with reasonable effort; and (e) through a random sample, 
it was estimated that almost 2,000 members had 10 or more odd-
lot transactions during the period in question.00 Judge Tyler also 
considered an analysis of the costs incurred in administration of 2 
other large class actions70 and the projected costs of providing notice 
to members of the Eisen class.71 
Applying the criteria set forth by the court of appeals,72 Judge 
Tyler had little difficulty concluding that the class was adequately 
represented. He noted the conduct of plaintiff's counsel as evidence 
of his capability and the fervor of the litigation as demonstration 
of the lack of collusion between the parties.78 Recognizing that 
manageability posed "the most difficult question to be considered 
by this court,''74 Judge Tyler considered various aspects of the 
problem of damage calculation and distribution. He concluded that 
by using the defendants' records and studies conducted for or by 
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) on odd-lot trading 
it was possible to estimate gross damages without requiring the 
filing of individual claims by each class member.76 Relying on the 
experience from the antibiotic drug cases76 to appraise the mechanics 
of administration, Judge Tyler attempted to estimate the expenses 
of providing the necessary notice and processing of claims and con-
cluded that the total sum required was about $500,000.77 He further 
stated that claims could be proved by verification or certification by 
a claimant's broker-dealer or the records of the individual claim-
ants.78 Judge Tyler recognized the necessity of assuring that class 
members would share in any eventual judgment and found it appro-
68. These brokerage firms transmit their customers' orders directly by teletype to 
the defendants. The defendants maintain computer tapes on which are recorded the 
transactions of each wire firm customer. By comparing the transactional data recorded 
by the defendants with the names and addresses recorded by the brokers, the members 
of the class may be identified. 52 F.R.D. at 257. 
69. 52 F.R.D. at 257, 259. 
70. 52 F.R.D. at 259-60, discussing West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer&: Co., 314 F. Supp. 
710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), affd., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3166 (U.S. 
Oct. 12, 1971); Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corp., 201 F. Supp. 934 (D. Mass. 
1962). 
71. 52 F.R.D. at 263, 267-68. See notes 152-53 infra and accompanying text. 
72. See text accompanying note 16 supra. 
73. 52 F.R.D. at 261. 
74. 52 F.R.D. at 261. 
75. 52 F.R.D. at 262. 
76. See text accompanying notes 189-97 infra. 
77. 52 F.R.D. at 263. 
78. 52 F.R.D. at 263. 
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priate to consider the possibility of a "fluid class recovery," in which 
any unclaimed portion of a damage award would be used to benefit 
the entire class by applying the damage fund to reduce the odd-lot 
differential charged by the defendants in the future.79 While not 
definitively ruling on the precise form that such a distribution 
scheme might take, he was satisfied that the concept had sufficient 
merit to assure that some method of distribution would be pos-
sible. 80 Comparing the probable administrative costs with the range 
of damages that would be awarded upon a finding of liability, Judge 
Tyler concluded: "Thus, it becomes apparent that if plaintiff suc-
ceeds on behalf of the dass, there will be a substantial recovery to 
be distributed."81 
Turning to the problems associated with the necessity of giving 
notice to the class members,82 Judge Tyler interpreted Rule 23(c)(2) 
as an expression of the requirements of due process as perceived by 
the Advisory Committee. He interpreted the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.83 as requiring 
a flexible test designed to ensure adequate representation and pro-
tection for those persons not present but bound by the judgment. 
Judge Tyler reasoned: 
Consequently, where a class consists of a large number of claimants 
with relatively small individual claims, notice to individual cl,ass 
members, as a legal and practical matter, becomes less important 
and need not be unduly emphasized or required.84 
He ordered a comprehensive scheme of notice, which did not how-
ever require individual notification for each identifiable class mem-
ber. 86 Despite the wording of Rule 23(c)(2)86 and the arguments 
made by the defendants that any mailed notice must go to all of 
the approximately two million identifiable class members, the court 
thought it necessary to recognize that stringent notice requirements 
could "vitiate the class action device in situations where application 
thereof as a matter of public policy can be important, such as -pri-
vate antitrust, consumer and environmental litigation."87 The court 
concluded that the suit was a proper class _ac~ion under Rule 23.88 
Since the plaintiff had indicated that he would be unable to under-
79. 52 F.R.D. at 264-65. See text accompanying notes 172-73 infra. 
80. 52 F.R.D. at 264-65. 
81. 52 F.R.D. at 265. 
82. See text accompanying notes 115-23 infra. 
83. 339 U.S. 306 (1950). 
84. 52 F.R.D. at 266. 
85. 52 F.R.D. at 267-68. See text _accompanying nqtes 118-23 infra. 
86. See note 2_ supra. 
87- 52 F~D. at 266. ·. _ 
88. 52 F.R.D. at 272, 
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take the cost of providing notice, the court ordered a preliminary 
hearing on the merits, after which it would determine if the defend-
ants might properly be ordered to advance the cost. Although the 
court recognized that as a practical matter the initial allocation of 
the notice costs might determine whether the suit would indeed be 
brought, it regarded this issue as separate from that of the propriety 
and manageability of the class action under the federal rule.80 
In the second case, City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co.,00 
a federal court in New Jersey considered certification of four over-
lapping class actions brought to recover damages allegedly incurred 
because of violations of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act by eight major 
oil companies. The defendants had been indicted in 1965 under 
section I of the Sherman Act for unlawfully conspiring and com-
bining to fix and maintain tank wagon and retail gasoline prices 
and for limiting the amount of gasoline available to private brand 
distributors and retailers in the trading area of Delaware, New 
Jersey, and Pennsylvania between 1955 and 1965. Additional counts 
charged four of the defendants with violations of section 2 of the 
Sherman Act for unlawful combination and conspiracy to monopo-
lize and attempt to monopolize. The defendants entered a plea 
of nolo contendere on the eve of the criminal trial in 1969 after 
three of the class actions had been filed.01 The complaint in each class 
action substantially tracked the indictment.02 
The State of New Jersey and the City of Philadelphia combined 
to bring suit93 representing 
all state and municipal governments, governmental agencies, authori-
ties, commissions and subdivisions and all other ultimate consum-
ers situated throughout the States of Pennsylvania, New Jersey and 
Delaware which have purchased, directly or indirectly, for use and 
not for resale, 94 
gasoline from the defendants between 1955 and 1965. The second 
consumer class action95 was brought by McCloskey and Company, 
a large construction corporation, seeking to represent all individuals, 
corporations and other entities (but excluding governmental units) 
89. 52 F.R.D. at 272. 
90. 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971). 
91. See 53 F.R.D. at 47-49. 
92. 53 F.R.D. at 49. 
93. Although the actions had been commenced independently, the parties filed a 
consolidated and amended complaint prior to trial. 53 F.R.D. at 48. 
94. 53 F.R.D. at 48. 
95. The court refers to the three class suits as "consumer class actions" throughout 
the opinion. The focus of this Comment is primarily on the subclass of the Philadel-
phia-New Jersey class comprised of consumer motorists who purchased gasoline at re• 
tail prices. See text accompanying notes 109-11 infra. 
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situated in the trading area that had purchased gasoline from the 
defendants in tank wagon quantities or at tank wagon prices for 
their own consumption. The court estimated that this class had 
approximately 10,000 members.96 The final consumer class action 
was brought by the Yellow Cab Company, seeking to represent "all 
individuals, partnerships, corporations and other entities engaged 
in the business of furnishing taxicab, limousine and related ser-
vices,"97 but excluding governmental units. This class contained 
over 500 members, but Yellow Cab accounted for almost one quarter 
of the taxicabs operating in the three-state area.98 Potential overlap 
among the classes was solved by agreements among the plaintiffs.99 
The defendants argued that common questions did not pre-
dominate over individual questions as required by subsection (b)(3) 
and that the plaintiffs could not overcome the manageability diffi-
culties that would arise in the class actions because of the complexity 
of the gasoline pricing structure.100 As to the Philadelphia-New 
Jersey class, the defendants also challenged the adequacy of repre-
sentation and the additional requirement of Rule 23(a)(3) that the 
plaintiffs' claims be typical of the claims of the class.101 By applying 
the Eisen test of adequacy of representation102 and by separating the 
issue of the conspiracy from the issues of individual damages, the 
court found that all the classes satisfied the requirements of Rule 
23(a).103 The court concluded that the Philadelphia-New Jersey 
plaintiffs did have claims typical of the class they purported to repre-
sent because "proof needed to demonstrate [the conspiracy] will be 
the same irrespective of whether one purchased in five hundred 
gallon quantities or from retail service stations."104 
Recognizing the significance of the Eisen decision, which had 
established expansive parameters for Rule 23(b)(3) by certifying a 
class of six million persons, the court sought to distinguish City of 
Philadelphia because of the complexity of the gasoline pricing 
structure, and particularly because of the absence of an average 
transaction or price differential. The court also noted that it did 
not have a structural analysis of the industry prepared by indepen-
dent parties, which had been present in the Eisen case in the form 
96. 53 F.R.D. at 70. 
97. 53 F.R.D. at 49. 
98. 53 F.R.D. at 49, 70. 
99. 53 F.R.D. at 48-49, 53. 
100. 53 F.R.D. at 59-61. For a general discussion of the gasoline pricing structure, 
see 53 F.R.D. at 58-59. 
101. 53 F.R.D. at 60. 
102. See text accompanying note 16 supra. 
103. 53 F.R.D. at 68. 
104. 53 F.R.D. at 68. 
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of SEC-sponsored studies.105 The court also distinguished the prece• 
dent provided by various antibiotic drug cases,100 stating that those 
cases rest upon the 
belief that a total damage award could be established for the entire 
class. Such a total damage figure against which damages may be 
claimed by individuals would be much more difficult to achieve in 
the consumer actions pending in this Court. Even if such a figure 
could be ascertained, significant problems would remain. Unlike 
the antibiotic price structure, the gasoline price structure was much 
less stable and more complex because of the various methods of sale, 
thus creating problems for awarding individual damages.107 
Despite this complicating factor, the court certified the McCloskey 
and Yellow Cab classes, relying heavily on the business records that 
members of these classes presumably had maintained and that would 
provide a basis for calculation of individual damages. 
The court divided the Philadelphia-New Jersey class into three 
subclasses in order to assess the manageability problems.108 The 
court certified the subclass of governmental agencies and authorities, 
relying again on the records of quantity, quality, and price of gas-
oline that the class members had kept. As to the nongovernmental 
components of the Philadelphia-New Jersey class, the court divided 
the class into tank wagon purchasers and retail purchasers. The 
court recognized that the tank wagon subclass corresponded precisely 
with the McCloskey class, which it had certified. But as to the non-
governmental purchasers who had purchased at retail-namely, 
motorists who had purchased gasoline at pump prices-the court 
found that "the problems inherent in administering damage claims, 
if liability and a general level of damages are established, are stagger-
ing."100 
Although recognizing that individual motorists had purchased 
more gasoline than all other ultimate users combined, the court 
felt constrained to find this class unmanageable, and therefore re-
jected certification of the class action.110 The court felt that, unlike 
the McCloskey, Yellow Cab, and governmental classes, individual 
consumers would not have the necessary records of purchase to allow 
a calculation of individual damages. Since many purchases had been 
made in cash and the defendants did not possess the credit card 
statements of charged purchases for the relevant period, the court 
105. 53 F.R.D. at 63-64. 
106. See text accompanying notes 189-210 infra. 
107. 53 F.R.D. at 65. 
108. 53 F.R.D. at 70-71. 
109. 53 F.R.D. at 71. 
110. 53 F.R.D. at 72-73. 
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concluded that a distribution of damages to the class would be 
impossible regardless of a finding of the total damages incurred by 
the class. Furthermore, the court rejected the notion of a fluid class 
recovery that had been considered in the Eisen case: 
Such a solution to the problems of awarding damages to individual 
claimants is not realistically available for the group here under 
consideration. The motorist who purchased gasoline from a retail 
station during the relevant period is still likely, if he has not moved 
out of the trading area, to continue his purchases of gasoline. How-
ever, he will be joined by many persons who were either not old 
enough to have had a driver's license or were not residing in the 
trading area between 1955 and 1965. Any fluid class recovery would 
be a windfall to them and a deprivation to the motorist entitled to 
recovery. This Court, believing that the composition of the motoring 
public which purchased from retail stations has changed consider-
ably during and since the alleged conspiracy ended, concludes that 
there can not be a fluid class recovery for this group of the Phila-
delphia-New Jersey class.111 
The irony of the court's decision is plain. The class actions sought 
on behalf of large volume purchasers, such as governmental agencies 
and business entities-for whom gasoline is a significant component 
of their costs and for whom an individual suit is likely to be finan-
cially feasible-are permitted. But a class action, seeking to repre-
sent the "smaller guy," for whom no alternative means of recovery 
are feasible, is not permitted, despite the express realization that 
"the bulk of the ill-gotten gains reaped by defendants through their 
assumed conspiracy will remain untouched within their corporate 
coffers. "112 
Eisen and City of Philadelphia provide a framework around 
which to analyze two of the most significant manageability prob-
lems-the notice that must be given to absent class members when 
a Rule 23(b)(3) class action is proposed and the procedures that will 
facilitate the calculation and distribution of damages to members 
of the class without overwhelming court time and resources. 
III. MANAGEABILITY OF NoTICE UNDER RuLE 23(c)(2) 
Class actions brought under the amended federal rule are in-
tended to determine the rights of all persons, present or absent, 
whom the court finds to be members of the class.113 In Hansberry v. 
Lee,114 the Supreme Court held that class actions must fairly ensure 
the protection of the interests of absent parties in order to comply 
111. 53 F.R.D. at 72. 
112. 53 F.R.D. at 73. 
113. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(2)-(3), set out in note 2 supra. 
114. 311 U.S. 32 (1940). 
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with due process. Only when absent members of the class are ade-
quately represented will the judgment be given res judicata effect. 
Under the new rule the problem of absent parties will be most 
prominent in subsection (b)(3) actions, in which a class represen-
tative is likely to commence suit without consultation with other 
class members. Rule 23 therefore provides that absent members 
may exclude themselves from the class or enter an appearance 
through counsel. These members are to be given notice of any 
action and of the options available to them. Specifically, the rule 
provides: 
[Rule 23 (c)(2)] In any class action maintained under subdivision 
(b)(3), the court shall direct to the members of the class the best 
notice practicable under the circumstances, including individual 
notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable 
effort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will 
exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) 
the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members 
who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not 
request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through 
his counsel.115 
It was with this requirement in mind that the Second Circuit in 
remanding the Eisen case cautioned that an evidentiary finding 
that many members of the Eisen class could be identified with rea-
sonable effort, and a subsequent failure of the plaintiff to furnish 
individual notice to those class members, might well require dis-
missal of the class suit.m The requirement of individual notice 
also contributed to the decision in City of Philadelphia to deny 
certification of the class action because of the problems that would 
arise in attempting to give notice to the members of the Philadel-
phia-New Jersey subclass.117 
In Eisen Judge Tyler subsequently found that two million mem-
bers of the class were identifiable,118 and the defendants argued that 
individual notice should be given to each of these members. Al-
though noting that the argument was not without merit, Judge Tyler 
rejected it because "such notice is not compelled by the standards 
of due process and Rule 23(c)(2) in the context of this case."119 
Instead, he proposed a three-stage notice plan: (1) individual notice 
ll5. FED. R. Cxv. P. 23(c)(2) (emphasis added). 
ll6. 391 F.2d at 570. The plaintiff had asserted from the outset that he would not 
be able to pay for the forms and methods of notice ordered by the court, 52 F.R.D, at 
269. 
117. 53 F.R.D. at 71. 
118. He found that the remaining 4 million members could not be identified "with 
reasonable effort." 52 F.R.D .. at 257. 
119. 52 F.R.D. at 267. 
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would be given to each of the member firms of the New York Stock 
Exchange and to all commercial banks with large trust departments 
in an attempt to provide many class members with indirect but 
nevertheless effective notice;120 (2) individual notice would be sent 
to the 2,000 identifiable members of the class who had conducted 
ten or more odd-lot transactions during the relevant period,121 and 
to 5,000 additional class members selected at random;122 and (3) 
notice by publication would be provided in the Wall Street Journal 
and in the New York Times, San Francisco Chronicle, San Francisco 
Examiner, and Los Angeles Times since New York and California 
had the largest number of shareholders of all states involved.123 
The precise conflict that Eisen raised, namely, the balancing of 
the notice required by Rule 23(c)(2) with the policy consideration 
that "expensive and stringent notice requirements could vitiate the 
class action device in situations where application thereof as a matter 
of public policy can be important,"124 has been anticipated by a 
number of commentators.125 To a substantial degree, Judge Tyler's 
attitude toward the policy behind the notice requirement of Rule 
23(c)(2) and his specific plan for providing notice reflect the pre-
vailing consensus of the commentators.126 Central to this position is 
the finding that Rule 23 was an attempt by the Advisory Committee 
to embody the requirements of due process in the class action rule 
and that "Rule 23(c)(2) does not add to these requirements; it 
simply formulates guidelines for a particular kind of notice in a 
particular kind of action."127 The Advisory Committee was avowedly 
attempting to incorporate in subsection (c)(2) the due process re-
quirements that the Supreme Court had set forth in Hansberry and 
120. 52 F.R.D. at 267. 
121. 52 F.R.D. at 267. The district court hoped thereby to comply with the sugges-
tion of the court of appeals that notice should be given to those persons who "may 
possess enough of a stake in the proceedings to justify personal intervention." 391 F.2d 
at 569. 
122. 52 F.R.D. at 267. Notice to members selected at random is designed to assure 
that any significant subclass that might challenge the adequacy of the plaintiff's 
representation would come to the attention of the court. Expressions of displeasure 
would cause the court to re-examine the adequacy of representation. 391 F.2d at 563. 
123. 52 F.R.D. at 268. See also Appendix A, Geographic Distribution of Shareowners 
of Public Corporations, 52 F.R.D. at 273. 
124. 52 F.R.D. at 266. 
125. Homburger, supra note 53; at 637-47; Comment, Adequate Representation, 
Notice and the New Class Action Rule: Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securi-
ties Laws, 116 U. PA. L. R.Ev. 889, 905-19 (1968); Note, Class Actions Under Federal 
Rule 2!J(bX!J)-The Notice Requirement, 29 Mo. L. R.Ev. 139 (1969); Note, Federal 
Rule 2!J(c)(2)-Notice in Class Actions-Mullane Reconsidered, 43 TULANE L. REv. 369 
(1969). 
126. See, e.g., the ~orms of notice suggested in Comment, supra note 125, at 918. 
127. 52 F.R.D. at 266. 
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Mullane.128 Some commentators have argued that since the Advisory 
Committee had this limited purpose in drafting subsection (c)(2), 
a showing that it had mistakenly interpreted the Hansberry and 
Mullane mandates would be sufficient to permit a judicial end run 
around the individual notice requirement as long as a court com-
plied with the "correct" notions of due process.120 To that end, 
Hansberry has been interpreted as requiring an adequacy of repre-
sentation that may be assured by means short of individual notice 
to all identifiable class members,130 and Mullane has been interpreted 
as requiring a balancing of interests between the form of reasonable 
notice required and the "practicalities and peculiarities" of the 
litigation context.131 Other commentators have even suggested that 
the Committee's interpretation of Hansberry and Mullane was not 
only faulty, but also unnecessary since the concept of due process 
in representative actions may not require any notice when there is 
a direct and compelling state interest or a basis for presuming con-
sent of class members.132 Those calling for a circumvention of the 
literal impact of the individual notice requirement have sought to 
explain the flexible application of the notice mandate by focusing on 
the "reasonable effort" or "best notice practicable under the circum-
stances" as authorization for the use of judicial discretion.188 
This approach to Rule 23(c)(2) would be significantly under-
mined, however, by any showing that the Advisory Committee in-
tentionally embodied within the notice requirement a more stringent 
standard than that compelled by due process. The Preliminary Draft 
of the Amendments to the Rules of Civil Procedure,184 published in 
1964, contained the following notice provision under subsection 
(c)(2): 
To afford members of the class an opportunity to request exclusion, 
the court shall direct that reasonable notice be given to the class, in-
cluding specific notice to each member known to be engaged in a 
separate suit on the same subject matter ·with the party opposed to 
the class.135 
128. Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 107. 
129. E.g., Note, 29 MD. L. REv. 139, supra note 125, at 153•54. 
130. E.g., Z. CHAFEE, supra note 5, at 232-37; Note, 29 MD. L. REv. 139, supra note 
125, at 142-43. 
131. E.g., Comment, supra note 125, at 911-15; Note, 29 MD. L. R.Ev. 139, supra note 
125, at 143-50. 
132. Maraist 8: Sharp, Federal Procedure's Troubled Marriage: Due Process and the 
Class Action, 49 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 1 (1970). 
133. E.g., Note, 29 MD. L. REv. 139, supra note 125, at 151-54. Contra, Note, Class 
Actions Under Amended Rule 23: Three Years of Judicial Interpretation, 49 B.U. L. 
REv. 682, 704 (1969). 
134. Preliminary Draft of Proposed Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure for the 
United States District Courts, 34 F.R.D. 325 (1964) [hereinafter Preliminary Draft]. 
135. Id. at 386. 
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Although this subsection was substantially altered before adoption 
in 1966, the Advisory Committee Note to that provision, in which the 
drafters expressed their belief that they had fulfilled the demands of 
due process, remained virtually unaltered between the 1964 and 1966 
versions.136 In other words, the Committee felt that the 1964 notice 
provision already satisfied the due process requirements of Hansberry 
and Mullane. The Committee's decision to propose more onerous 
notice standards must have reflected either a revised notion of the 
due process requirements or an intention to promote another policy 
objective. 
The Advisory Committee recognized that the proposed amendment 
of Rule 23 was a substantial deviation from the former rule, most 
notably in the provision that all members of the class would be in-
cluded in the judgment;137 previously the extent of the judgment was 
determined by the nature of the rights adjudicated. Acknowledg-
ing the innovations contained in the Preliminary Draft, the Commit-
tee specifically solicited comments from the bench and the bar 
regarding subsections (b)(3) and (c)(2).138 The response was not over-
whelmingly positive,189 and much of the criticism revolved around the 
binding effect that the Committee intended would be given to 
judgments affecting absent persons who had taken no affirmative 
action either to be included or excluded from the class or who had 
received no notice that a suit was being brought in their behalf.140 
Since the incomplete and inconsistent application of res judicata 
effects under the provisions of the former rule had been a principal 
source of its difficulty,141 the Committee may well have been unwill-
ing to abandon this aspect of the rule revision. It did recognize that 
the objection to giving binding effect to class actions based merely on 
common questions under Rule 23(b)(3) could be partially mitigated 
by a strong notice provision that would increase the opportunity for 
unwilling persons to exclude themselves from the class.142 If, indeed, 
this was the reason for the alteration of the notice provision between 
1964 and 1966, and that provision was not merely a reassessment of 
the Committee's concept of due process, then the requirement that 
136. Compare Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 106-07, with Preliminary Draft, supra 
note 134, at 394-95. 
137. See text accompanying notes 113-15 supra. 
138. Preliminary Draft, supra note 134, at 395. 
139. E.g., COMMrIT.EE ON FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE-JUDICIAL CONFERENCE-
NINTH CIRCUIT, REPORT, 36 F.R.D. 209, 222-26 (1964); id., SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, 37 
F.R.D. 71, 71-72, 76-77, 79-85 (1965); id., SECOND SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, 37 F.R.D. 499, 
500, 520-23 (1965). 
140. See Frankel, supra note 3, at 299-300; Kaplan, Continuing Work of the Civil 
Committee: 1966 Amendments of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (1), 81 HARv. L. 
REv. 356, 397 (1967). 
141. Advisory Note, supra note 5, at 98-99; Z. CHAFEE, supra note 5, at 250-58. 
142. SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT, .•upra note 139, at 81-82. 
358 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 70:888 
individual notice be given to identifiable members cannot be dis-
missed as an error of interpretation. Instead, it must be regarded 
as a mechanism intended to allow potential class members a mean-
ingful opportunity to withdraw from the class. As such, its literal 
application cannot be avoided by a finding that its terms are more 
stringent than minimal compliance with due process would otherwise 
dictate. 
On balance, the approach offered by Judge Tyler is a more re-
sponsive interpretation of Rule 23(c)(2) and may well be a more 
accurate interpretation of the intended operation and scope of the 
notice provision. The deficiency of the "trade-off" analysis is that it 
amounts to little more than speculation. More importantly, it runs 
counter to at least one expression of the purpose of the amended 
rule. Consider in this regard the personal reflections on the notice 
provision by Professor Benjamin Kaplan, the Reporter to the Ad-
visory Committee: 
Again, the critics undervalued the (c)(2) notice, even when con-
sidered apart from the discretionary notice possibilities of sub-
division (d). In particular cases it may be practical to give notice 
under (c)(2) which will reach each member of the class. That will 
not be possible in all cases, but when large numbers of people are 
dealt with, perfect notice, while on the one hand hard to attain be-
comes on the other hand unnecessary because of the probability that 
some individuals who are representative of differing opinions within 
the group (if such differences exist) will in fact be reached and will 
speak up. Notice which is fair in the circumstances of the case is a 
constitutional requirement. We can therefore expect courts to work 
toward providing the best practicable notice, as indeed (c)(2) in terms 
requires.14s 
The approach taken by Judge Tyler in arriving at his three-stage 
notice provision in Eisen mirrors Professor Kaplan's interpretation 
of the purpose of Rule 23(c)(2).144 Furthermore, vesting the judge 
with discretion to mold the parameters of the class action is perhaps 
the most significant general feature of the amended rule146 and is con-
sistent with the approach taken in Eisen. 
· Providing notice to the members of a large class, even under a 
liberal interpretation of Rule 23(c)(2), can be a costly proposition. 
143. Kaplan, supra note 140, at 396. 
144. 52 F.R.D. at 267-68, citing Kaplan, supra note 140. 
145. See the dissent of Justice Black to the adoption of the amended rule at 883 U.S. 
1031, 1035 (1966): 
I particularly think that every member of the Court should examine with great 
care the amendments relating to class suits. It seems to me that they place too much 
power in the hands of the trial judges and that the rules might almost as well 
simply,provide µiat "class suits can be maintained either for or against particular 
groups whenever in the discretion of a judge he thinks it is wise." 
See also Z. CHAn:E, supra note 5,.at 288-95; Frankel, s.upra note 2, at 801, , 
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It is not surprising then that courts have already been presented 
with the issue of the allocation of the expenses of providing notice. 
In Eisen, the district court recognized that as a practical matter 
the allocation of expenses might determine whether the plaintiff 
could proceed with the action.146 Although the court of appeals as-
sumed that the plaintiff would have to bear the costs of notice,147 
the district court felt that the issue was not conclusively determined 
for the circuit148 and ordered a preliminary hearing on the merits 
after which it would decide if the defendants might properly be 
required to advance the costs of providing notice. In City of Philadel-
phia, counsel for the Philadelphia-New Jersey class agreed to pay 
the costs of notice, and the court found it unnecessary to analyze 
the problems of notice in depth because other factors were dispositive 
of the case.140 It is important to recognize, however, that the practical 
effect of the allocation of costs on the ability of the plaintiff to bring 
suit is not the only context in which the scope and costs of notice 
are relevant. The ultimate costs of notice will be deducted from 
any recovery the class might receive before any funds are distributed 
to class members.150 To the extent that the costs of notice are sub-
stantial because of the wide scope of notice ordered, it may reduce 
the likelihood that significant funds will remain after the costs of 
litigation are paid151 and influence a court to refuse certification of 
a class. In Eisen, for example, the court determined that the cost 
of providing notice through its three-stage plan would amount to 
approximately $21,720;152 and if it had ordered individual notice 
to the 2 million identifiable members of the class the cost would have 
exceeded $200,000.163 Since the court estimated that even a minimal 
recovery from the defendants would approximate 22 million dollars 
when trebled,164 the impact of a wider scope of notice would not 
146. 52 F.R.D. at 269-70. 
147. 391 F.2d at 568. 
148. "Indeed, despite the apparently unequivocal language in Eisen II .•• the Court 
of Appeals for this circuit has indicated in a subsequent opinion that the question is 
still an open one. Green v. Wolfe Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 n.15 (2d Cir. 1968)." 52 
F.R.D. at 269. 
149. 53 F.R.D. at 57. 
150. See West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 314 F. Supp. 710, 725, 731, 747 (S.D.N.Y. 
1970), affd., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 40 U.S.L.W. 3166 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971), 
discussed in text following note 188 infra. 
151. Just liow notice can be worded which could alert so large a "class" to the 
possibility that proceedings in the Southern District, if carried fonvard, would 
someday enrich each by a few dollars, if there be anything left after expenses and 
attorneys' fees, is a mystery to me. 
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 570 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, J., dissenting). 
152. 52 F.R.D. at 267-68 (individual notice: $1,000; notice by publication: $20,720). 
153. 52 F.R.D. at 260. 
154. 52 F.R.D. at 265. Because tile odd-lot differential had been lowered by 5 million 
dollars per year as of 1966, the court was able to estimate a reasonable range of re~ver-
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have been determinative. But it is not difficult to envision a case in 
which a court would refuse certification on the ground that the 
costs of litigation threatened to exceed any damage award that the 
court could foresee at that stage of the litigation. Even when the 
plaintiff is able to provide the notice ordered or the court determines 
through a preliminary hearing that the defendant ought to advance 
the costs of providing notice, courts should be reluctant to prescribe 
extensive notice that will only reduce the ultimate recovery. The 
various constraints on the operation of class actions that arise from a 
literal application of Rule 23(c)(2) are likely to be avoided through 
court-ordered notice that is more consonant with the policy and 
intention embodied in the amended federal rule. 
IV. MANAGEABILITY OF CALCULATION AND 
DISTRIBUTION OF DAMAGES 
To the extent that the class action mechanism is designed to in-
duce individuals to litigate small but valid claims-and there can be 
no doubt that this is a major goal of the class action-the primary 
focus on manageability must eventually be directed to the desired 
end result: the actual recovery of losses by individual members of 
the class. If, after months or years of litigation, volumes of testimony, 
and thousands of court hours, the prospects of distribution of dam-
ages to class members are dim because of the impossibility of proof 
of damages or insurmountable administrative burdens and costs, 
then the class action mechanism is inadequate for its designed pur-
pose. Indeed, the courts have generally recognized the importance 
of determining that eventual distribution is possible (assuming that 
liability can be established) before undertaking full-scale proceed-
ings. This factor was recognized in both the Eisen166 and City of 
Philadelphia166 decisions. 
An analysis of the distribution process currently utilized to ad-
minister damages in class actions reveals serious limitations, which 
challenge the ability of the courts to fashion a manageable remedy. 
These limitations will be examined, as will a possible alternative to 
able damages with which to compare the anticipated costs of litigation. Generally, such 
data are not likely to be available to courts at this stage of the litigation. This will 
lead courts to make conservative estimates of recoverable damages, thus increasing the 
impact that a wide scope of notice will have on the decision of the court to grant or 
refuse certification of the class. 
155. "Bearing in mind the desirability of providing small claimants with a forum in 
which to seek redress for alleged large scale anti-trust violations, we are still reluctant 
to permit actions to proceed where they are not likely to benefit anyone but the law-
yers who bring them." 391 F.2d at 567. 
156. "It is readily apparent that no matter how easy it is to establish damages on a 
class level, if it is extremely difficult or almost impossible to distribute these sums to 
their rightful recipients, the class is unmanageable." 53 F.R.D. at 72. 
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the current damage distribution procedure-the fluid class recovery. 
The proposed alternative compensates for the shortcomings of the 
present distribution mechanism and has the potential of relieving 
the court of any active role in this distribution process, while at the 
same time assuring the rights of the defendant and the vitality of the 
class action rule. 
A. Present Distribution Procedure 
The procedure by which damages are presently calculated, proved, 
and distributed in class actions does not differ significantly from the 
process by which damages are ordinarily handled in the nonclass 
action context. Upon a finding of liability, the court may direct under 
Rule 23(d)167 that class members be informed that liability has been 
established and that damage claims may be submitted. The court 
may additionally provide a claim form to facilitate a uniform system 
of claim verification. When the defendant has detailed records from 
which damages may be calculated, no appearance by individual mem-
bers of the class need be required. When defendants' records are not 
complete, members' claims may be submitted to a committee of 
counsel for a determination of those claims that are acceptable to 
both sides, with challenges decided by the court.158 Once the total 
amount of provable damages is established, pro rata deductions for 
litigation expenses such as notice and attorneys' fees may be made, 
with the remainder distributed to the individual class members.159 
This method of damage calculation and administration has seri-
ous limitations that result from its failure to accept and accommodate 
the differences between ordinary party litigation and the class action. 
As noted in City of Philadelphia, it is the difficulty of administering 
the damage distribution process that poses a serious threat-and 
in the case of the Philadelphia-New Jersey nongovernmental subclass, 
the fatal blow-to effective utilization of the class action mechan-
ism.100 
One limitation of the present system, which may only be tem-
porary, arises from the fact that individual consumers are not likely 
to retain the records necessary to prove actual damages in the sense 
ordinarily contemplated in the litigation context. Since the damages 
per individual are small in consumer class actions,161 the consumers 
are unlikely to retain records, as they might in large dollar trans-
actions or as a business retains records for financial reporting pur-
157. See note 2 supra. 
158. See 53 F.R.D. at 72. 
159. Hornstein, Legal Therapeutics: The "Salvage" Factor in Counsel Fee Awards, 
69 HARV. L, REV. 658 (1956). 
160. 53 F.R.D. at 73-74. 
161. Kalven &: Rosenfield, supra note 5, at 684-86. 
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poses. While the "logical alternative is to use the defendants' records, 
such records may not be available in cases when the alleged illegal 
transaction transpired years before the litigation. For example, in 
City of Philadelphia, the alleged antitrust violations occurred be-
tween 1955 and 1965; records going back fifteen years, in some 
instances, would be required to substantiate those damage claims.162 
The situation is further exacerbated by the complexity of class action 
suits, which may result in years 0£ litigation before liability is estab-
lished and attention is finally directed to proof of damages.168 It is 
likely that as the parameters of the class action rule are gradually 
established class action litigation will be expedited. But at least in 
the short run the inherent time lag between the illegal transactions 
and the stage of litigation when damage proof is to be submitted 
decreases the probability that consumers will be able to satisfy the 
traditional standards of damage proof. 
A more substantial limitation on the present procedure results 
from the use of a committee of counsel to determine damage claims 
acceptable to both parties.164 This process is premised on the good 
faith efforts of the parties to minimize the active role of the court 
in determining individual claims. At the same time, the defendant 
must be assured of due process in the determination of damages and 
may therefore invoke the traditional procedural devices available to 
him. Thus, the defendant may seek transactional data from all class 
members, requests to admit, depositions, and admissions.166 In the 
separate trial that may be ordered to determine damages,100 the de-
fendant presumably can seek jury determination of asserted damage 
claims.167 This combination of procedural tactics, many of which are 
legitimate means of protecting the defendant's property rights, never-
theless increases the costs and effort of litigation to each class member. 
Even after a determination of liability, the class member may regard 
the costs and effort of providing proof as exceeding the value derived 
from even full recovery of his claim, especially when his individual 
claim is small. 
Perhaps the most serious limitation presented by the traditional 
damage proof and distribution process is that it directly contradicts 
162. Proof of damages might have been eased had credit card statements been avail-
able. Neither plaintiffs nor defendants, however, maintained such statements. 53 F.R.D. 
at 72. 
163. It took five years of litigation before the class action in Eisen was certified. 
See note 56 supra. 
164. See City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 71 (D.N.J. 1971). 
165. Handler, The Shift from Substantive to Procedural Innovation in Antitrust 
Suits, 71 COLUM. L. REv. I, 7 (1971). 
166. See text accompanying note 35 supra. 
167. Cf. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531, 541 (1970). The rationale of the Court in 
allowing a jury trial in a stockholders' derivative suit seems applicable to class actions. 
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the policy adopted by the Advisory Committee in the amended rule, 
which provides that all members of the class will be included in the 
judgment unless they take affirmative action to be excluded from the 
class.168 This deliberate decision to require persons to opt out of the 
class, instead of requiring affirmative action for inclusion in the 
class, was designed to advance the broad application of Rule 23(b)(3) 
actions. Although applied to the initial formation of the class, the 
theory of automatic inclusion is equally appropriate at the damage 
stage: 
If, now we consider the class, rather than the party opposed, we see 
that requiring the individuals affirmatively to request inclusion in 
the lawsuit would result in freezing out the claims of people--es-
pecially small claims held by small people-who for one reason or 
another, ignorance, timidity, unfamiliarity with business or legal 
matters, will simply not take the affirmative step.169 
Admittedly, class members will probably be less hesitant to file 
damage claims than they would have been to have affirmatively joined 
the class in the first place, but timidity and unfamiliarity are likely to 
continue to discourage filing by significant numbers of class members. 
Nonetheless, in City of Philadelphia, the court expressly held that affi-
davits would not be sufficient, and that individual motorists would 
have to resort to additional means of proof such as itemized de-
ductions on income tax returns to prove gasoline purchases.170 In 
Eisen, the court recognized that individual investors would have to 
reconstruct their odd-lot transactions during the years in question, 
with the assistance of their stockbrokers if necessary.171 The burden 
of complying with these standards of proof, as well as the inherent 
limiting factors of requiring affirmative action, combine to pose a 
serious threat to the prospects of assuring effective adjudication 
through class actions under the traditional procedure of damage 
calculation. This has led courts to seek alternative methods of cal-
culation that alleviate the necessity of proving individual damages. 
One such possibility is the fluid class recovery. 
B. The Fluid Class Recovery 
In considering the mechanics of the distribution of recovery in 
Eisen, Judge Tyler discussed the fluid class recovery as an alternative 
to personal and individual recoupment of damages.172 Under this 
168. FED. R. C1v. P. 23(c) (3), set out in note 2 supra. 
169. Kaplan, supra note 140, at 397-98. 
170. 53 F.R.D. at 72-73. 
171. 52 F.R.D. at 263-64. 
172. Judge Tyler noted that this form of recovery had been suggested by the plain-
tiff, who had been represented in the early stages of the litigation by Pomerantz, Levy, 
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distribution theory damages would be distributed to the class as a 
whole, rather than directly to individuals. While individuals would 
be permitted to recover damages they could prove, the unclaimed 
remainder of gross damages would be recovered from the defendants 
by reducing the odd-lot differential charged in subsequent transac-
tions until such time as the balance of the damages is returned to the 
class. A fluid class recovery would assure that the actual damages 
suffered would be returned to the class, albeit in a less direct manner 
than if all the members of the class had filed individual claims. 
A distribution system based on the concept of a fluid class recovery 
would largely alleviate the limitations in existing distribution for-
mulas. Upon a determination of liability, the court would simply 
undertake to establish gross damages, i.e., the aggregate damages 
suffered by the class as an entity. Of course, such a determination may 
not always be possible, particularly in industries in which constantly 
varying markups and costs make an assessment of damages on a per-
unit or average-transaction basis impossible. In the Eisen case, the 
court expressly found that gross damages could be calculated because 
the odd-lot differential was a recurring, standard charge that could 
be analyzed to yield the average illegal margin charged.173 At this 
stage of the litigation process the defendant would be permitted to 
contest the computation of damages by offering proof of varying 
margins or by demonstrating that the illegal margin was not charged 
in all transactions.174 In City of Philadelphia, the defendants in fact 
did offer evidence of the complexity of the gasoline pricing structure, 
which might have precluded any determination of gross damages.171l 
By this process, the defendant would have ample opportunity to de-
fend his property by countering the plaintiff's allegations and proof of 
damages. 
Once gross damages are determined, the court would in essence 
establish a damage fund. The subsequent steps in distributing the 
fund would be similar to distribution systems used in class actions 
that are settled out of court176 with judicial approval under Rule 
23(e). Deductions would be made from the fund to cover litigation 
expenses, with the remainder available for distribution to the class. 
Haudek & Block of New York City. See 370 F.2d at 119; 391 F.2d at 559. Abraham 
Pomerantz, an active advocate of the class action, suggested the gradual recoupmcnt of 
damages through a reduction in the odd-lot differential in New Developments ill Class 
Actions-Has Their Death Knell Been Sounded?, 25 Bus. LAw. 1259, 1260-65 (1970), 
under the heading "The 'Cy Pres' Doctrine in the Class Action." See text accompany• 
ing note 1 supra; Pomerantz &: Haudek, Class Actions, 2 REVIEW OF SECURITIES REGULA• 
TION 937 (1969). 
173. 52 F.R.D. at 257. 
174. But see Handler, supra note 165, at 6-7. 
175. 53 F.R.D. at 58. 
176. See generally Dole, supra note 41. 
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Those members of the class who have retained their transactional 
records and could satisfy the traditional standards of proof would be 
invited to file claims that would be examined through a committee of 
counsel or a random verification process.177 Since the amount of dam-
ages for which the defendant is liable is fixed by the determination 
of gross damages, the defendant has little incentive to thwart efforts 
at claim verification or to discourage the filing of claims by dilatory 
tactics. The fluid class recovery thus allows those persons who actively 
assert their rights and prove their claims to be awarded damages in 
direct relation to the proof that they offer.178 At the same time, the 
distribution procedure complements the policy of the Advisory Com-
mittee179 by offering a general recovery even to those class members 
who have not taken affirmative action by filing claims. 
I. Precedent for the Fluid Class Recovery 
Judge Tyler stated in Eisen that there is "respectable precedent" 
for the fluid class recovery.180 The cases cited by Judge Tyler not 
only presage the advent of the fluid class recovery; more importantly, 
they provide an insight into the ultimate question whether fluid class 
recovery solves the manageability problems of class actions. 
In Bebchick v. Public Utilities Commission,181 the plaintiff chal-
lenged an order by the Public Utilities Commission of the District 
of Columbia authorizing an increase in the fare charged Transit 
users. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals determined that 
the Commission had made errors in calculating net operating income, 
which resulted in an understating of the rate of return earned by 
Transit operations. The court concluded that the fare increase, 
amounting to a nickel on individual token purchases, should not 
have been granted. Although the plaintiff had sued in his own 
behalf and not as a representative of the class of Transit users, the 
court prescribed a broad remedy: "It is not feasible to require re-
funds to be made to individuals who paid the increase. Nevertheless, 
the amount realized by Transit from the increase must be utilized 
for the benefit of the class who paid it, that is, those who use the 
Transit."182 To that end, the court ordered the Transit to establish 
a fund in the amount of the illegal overcharge to be used for the 
purpose of benefiting Transit users in any rate proceedings pending 
or thereafter instituted. Recognizing that the actual amount charged 
or collected might not be available in cash, the court permitted the 
177. See City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45, 71 (D.N.J. 1971). 
178. See generally Kaplan, supra note 140, at 397. 
179. See text accompanying notes 168-69 supra. 
180. 52 F.R.D. at 264. 
181. 318 F.2d 187 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 373 U.S. 913 (1963). 
182. 318 F.2d at 203. 
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establishment of a reserve or special account on the books of the 
Transit. The utilization and disposition of the fund was left to the 
discretion of the Commission with regulatory authority over the 
Transit. 
In Daar v. Yellow Cab Co.,183 the plaintiff sought to bring a class 
action against a cab company, alleging that the company had set its 
taxicab meters to charge rates in excess of those authorized by the 
Public Utilities Commission of the City of Los Angeles. In separate 
counts, the plaintiff offered to represent two subclasses of taxicab 
passengers: those who had paid fares in script, known to the de-
fendants because of records kept of script sales, and those who had 
paid taxicab fares in cash. The superior court sustained a demurrer 
by the defendant and transferred the case to the municipal court after 
determining that the plaintiff could not maintain a class action and 
therefore could not satisfy the jurisdictional requirements to bring 
suit in the superior court. In reversing the superior court, the 
California supreme court referred to the issue of damage calcu-
lation and distribution at numerous points in its opinion. The 
court, taking the plaintiff's allegations of fact as true, found that 
the defendant could compute the amount of the overcharges from 
records in its possession and that it would therefore not be necessary 
for individual members of the class to make personal appearances 
to recover the full amount of the overcharges.184 In a footnote,186 the 
court discussed a suggestion made by the State of California as amicus 
curiae that the total amount of overcharges should be deposited with 
the superior court or an acceptable trustee and damages distributed 
to those who could identify themselves as class members. At the end 
of seven years, the funds would be presumed abandoned in accordance 
with California law. The court declined to rule on the merits of 
this proposal because it felt that such matters should be determined 
by the trial court.186 
183. 67 Cal. 2d 695, 433 P .2d 732, 63 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1967). 
184. 67 Cal. 2d 716, 433 P.2d at 747, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 739. 
185. 67 Cal. 2d at 715 n.15, 433 P .2d at 746 n.15, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 738 n,15. 
186. The parties settled out of court on October 19, 1970 for $1.4 million, of which 
$950,000 was to be returned to the class by a reduction of taxicab fares below the then 
existing maximum authorized fares. The defendants agreed to reduce fares in a mini• 
mum amount of $95,000 annually until the total fare reduction was completed. The 
remainder of the settlement was designated as attorneys' fees, Stipulation for Settlement 
and Judgment on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
The superior court held hearings on the fairness of the settlement, and judgment 
was entered on May 3, 1971. The final settlement, entered as a judgment, differed in 
several respects from the original settlement agreement and provided for $200,000 in 
attorneys' fees. The Board of Public Utilities and Transportation of the City of Los 
Angeles was charged with the duty of overseeing compliance with the judgment. The 
plaintiff recommended this form of recovery because it was feared that the cost of 
administering and supervising claims would consume a disproportionate amount of 
the money recovered in judgment. Letter from Leon Perlsweig, an attorney for the 
plaintiff, on file with the Michigan Law Review. 
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Despite its suggestive language, Daar is uncertain authority for 
any fluid class recovery. The California supreme court stated at two 
points in the decision that individuals damaged by the overcharge 
must ultimately prove separate claims.187 In a subsequent case, that 
court averred that Daar requires individual demonstration of dam-
ages.1ss 
As support for the use of a fluid class recovery, the Eisen court 
also cited the antibiotic drug cases. In West Virginia v. Chas. Pfizer 
& Co.,180 sixty-six civil suits alleging violation of the Sherman Act 
were consolidated in one class action.100 The defendant drug manu-
facturers offered a settlement of 100 million dollars, which was ac-
cepted by the majority of plaintiffs and submitted to the court for 
approval under Rule 23(e).101 The plaintiffs proposed various dis-
tribution schemes, the most important of which was the "Alabama 
Plan," which formed the basis for the plan later adopted by the 
defendants. Under that distribution plan, 37 million dollars was 
allocated for consumers, who were represented by governmental 
entities.192 The court quoted approvingly from the "Alabama Plan": 
After payments to individual consumers who have filed claims in 
accordance with the Court's notice are deducted from each entity's 
consumer fund, the balance, if any, should be held for distribution in 
accordance with each entity's internal, or second-stage allocation 
plan. Most entities joining in this allocation plan will seek court 
approval in their second-stage allocation plans for an additional 
period of time within which individual consumers may be permitted 
to file claims. Others may seek court approval to use the balance of 
their consumer fund for a public health purpose. The Court has 
the power, and, of course, should exercise its equitable control over 
these funds for the benefit of all consumers.193 
The foundation for this second-stage plan had been laid in 1969 
when notice by publication had been given to the consumer class 
members informing them that a failure to file claims by August 16, 
1969, would constitute authorization to whatever government official 
was their representative to use the funds in a manner designed to 
187. 67 Cal. 2d at 706,713,433 P.2d at 740, 745, 63 Cal. Rptr. at 732, 737. 
188. Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Ca~. 3d 800, 815, 484 P .2d 964, 973, 94 Cal. Rptr. 
796, 805 (1971). . . 
189. 314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), a/fd., 440 F.2d 1079 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 40 
U.S.L.W. 3166 (U.S. Oct. 12, 1971). . 
190. The actions were instituted by various governmental entities and representa-
tives of wholesalers and retailers. 314 F. Supp. at 721-22. 
191. See note 2 supra. 
192. The balance of the fund was allocated primarily to governmental agencies to 
compensate for institutional purchases (50 million dollars) and vendor reimbursement 
programs (10 million dollars). 314 F. Supp. at 728. : . 
193. 314 F. Supp. at 728. .. l.. • 
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benefit the citizens of the state.194 The propriety of allowing the 
states to recover damages through their attorneys general on behalf 
of individual consumers who had not filed claims was challenged on 
appeal by dissatisfied members of the class.105 The Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals affirmed the lower court decision that approved 
the settlement.106 
The settlement procedure adopted in the drug cases is signifi-
cant because the court had before it data from which it could rea-
sonably predict the amount of damages that seemed destined to go 
unclaimed by consumer members of the class. At the time the settle-
ment was approved, after the deadline for filing claims, 38,000 
customers had filed claims with an aggregate face amount of more 
than 16½ million dollars.197 Nevertheless, the court felt it within its 
power to allocate over fifty per cent of the settlement fund to the 
states in accordance with their intent to use the fluid class recovery 
for some public health purpose. 
Seven states refused to accept the defendant's offer to settle and 
were excluded from the settlement agreement in Pfizer. Their causes 
of action were assigned for completion of pretrial proceedings.108 Al-
though Judge Tyler did not consider these proceedings in his 
analysis of the fluid class recovery in Eisen,199 the proceedings were 
examined in City of Philadelphia as additional precedent for the 
fluid class recovery in large consumer class actions.200 
The seven states sought to represent two classes, governmental 
entities that had purchased antibiotics for their own use or for in-
stitutional purposes201 and retail purchasers of drugs.202 As to this 
latter consumer class, the court concluded that the requirements 
of Rule 23(a) were satisfied and that the common issues predominated 
over individual issues as required by Rule 23(b)(3).208 Although the 
194. 314 F. Supp. at 724-25. 
195. 440 F.2d at 1089. The appeal was taken by the wholesaler-retailer portion of 
the class. Of the settlement offer, only 3 million dollars, which the court admitted was 
an arbitrary "nuisance value allocation,'' was apportioned to this subclass. By passing 
on the illegal overcharges to its customers, this subclass may not have suffered any 
damages. See 314 F. Supp. at 728. 
196. 440 F.2d at 1092. 
197. 314 F. Supp. at 728. 
198. In re Multidistrict Private Civil Treble Damage Antitrust Litigation Involving 
Antibiotic Drugs, 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ,I 73,398 ij.P.M.L. 1970). 
199. Judge Tyler spoke of the "Drug Cases," but he apparently considered only 
314 F. Supp. 710 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See 52 F.R.D. at 259. 
200. 53 F.R.D. at 64-66. 
201. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 5 CCH 
TRADE REG. REP. ,I 73,481 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
202. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 5 CCH 
TRADE REG. REP. ,I 73,482 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
203. 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 11 73,482, at 89,960. 
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court felt that a sufficient showing had been made "to warrant the 
establishment of the proposed classes,"204 the order was conditioned 
on a showing that the actions were manageable and that satisfactory 
notice could be provided.205 On the issue of damage calculation, the 
court tentatively concluded that the amount of damages suffered 
by class members could be determined by estimating gross damages 
instead of aggregating individual damage claims.206 
In an opinion directed primarily to the requirements of Rule 
23(b)(3)(D) and the manageability problems presented, the court 
rejected the defendants' contention that an assessment of gross 
damages would violate their rights to a jury trial and due process.207 
Denying the defendants' claim that a class-wide recovery would re-
sult in a windfall to which the plaintiffs were not entitled, the court 
stated: 
If we assume that a price-fixing conspiracy is proven at trial, how-
ever, the defendants will certainly have no right to the "pot of gold" 
created by their illegal activities. And the success of their scheme and 
the size of the "pot" would certainly be no basis for leaving the 
money in their hands.20s 
The court did have difficulty in deciding whether damages proved 
through a calculation of total damages, but unclaimed by individual 
members, should be given to the states for the benefit of the absent 
class members.209 The court concluded that Rule 23 does not re-
quire that the funds be given to the class representatives, although 
it recognized that the alternative of returning unclaimed damages 
to the defendants was unattractive. It deferred consideration of the 
disposition of the residue until such time as the issue actually 
arose.210 Nevertheless, these pretrial orders are important steps in 
the acceptance of the fluid class recovery because of the express 
holding that calculation of damages by establishing the total dam-
ages suffered by the class as an entity preserves the due process 
rights to which the defendants are entitled. 
Taken together, the above cases do provide reasonable precedent 
204. 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ,r 73,482, at 89,959. 
205. 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ,J 73,482, at 89,962. 
206. 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ,I 73,482, at 89,960-61. 
207. In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Antibiotic Antitrust Actions, 5 CCH 
TRADE REG. REP. ,I 73,699, at 90,914 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). 
208. 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ,I 73,699, at 90,913. 
209. The court seemed concerned that awarding the residual to the states would 
constitute tacit recognition of the parens patriae concept. The court had previously 
denied the parens patriae claims raised by the states "without prejudice to renewal at 
a later date in the evel!t of a decision by the Supreme Court ••. in Hawaii v. Standard 
Oil Co., 431 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1970)." 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ,I 73,699, at 90,913 
n.6. Oral argument was heard in Standard Oil and is noted at 40 U.S.L.W. 3189 (U.S. 
Oct. 26, 1971). 
210. 5 CCH TRADE REG. REP. ,J 73,699, at 90,913-14. 
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for the use of a fluid class recovery. Bebchick, Daar, and Eisen in-
volved activities that are regulated by a commission. Both Bebchick 
and Eisen recognize the supervisory authority that will be exercised 
over the period of time necessary to deplete the damage fund.211 
When no such regulatory or enforcement body exists to police the 
administration of the fluid class recovery, it is not clear that the 
courts will be providing a more manageable solution of the dis-
tribution dilemma by employing a fluid class recovery. 
The drug cases, while offering perhaps the strongest support for 
the authority of a court to fashion a fluid class recovery, do not, 
however, suggest a solution to the manageability problems that will 
fall on a court that authorizes a fluid class recovery when no super-
visory agency is present. In the drug cases, governmental entities 
were the class representatives, and the residual was to be returned 
to them to be used at their discretion for public health purposes.212 
It is difficult to imagine representatives who might be better able 
to use the funds to benefit the class members. Governmental entities 
are as well equipped as the Public Utilities Commissions or the SEC 
to assure actual return of the fund balance to the consumer class. 
Therefore, although the three cases cited by Judge Tyler do pro-
vide precedent for the use of the fluid class recovery in Eisen, none 
of the cases suggests whether a court would authorize a fluid recovery 
when the class representatives are individual consumers or pur-
chasers and when the nature of the activity involved thrusts the 
court into an active role policing the decree over the time needed 
to deplete the fund. 
2. Applicability of the Fluid Class Recovery 
In discussing the applicability of the fluid class recovery, both 
the Eisen and City of Philadelphia courts felt that such a recovery 
was appropriate only in those situations in which, because of the 
high decree of repetitive activity by the members of the class, the 
court could be assured that the same persons who had incurred 
damages wouTd receive the benefits of the distribution. In Eisen the 
court believed that there was a sufficiently high level of repetitive 
activity to ensure that the individuals injured in past odd-lot trans-
actions would largely recoup their damages through future odd-lot 
dealings with the defendants at lower differentials.213 Conversely, 
in City of Philadelphia the court was concerned about the windfall 
that would accrue to the large number of new motorists who entered 
the relevant market subsequent to the alleged illegal activity; it 
211. 318 F.2d at 204; 52 F.R.D. at 265. 
212. See text accompanying note 193 supra. 
213. 52 F.R.D. at 265. 
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concluded that the composition of the class of motorists had changed 
sufficiently so as to rule out the application of a fluid class recovery.214 
However, it is by no means certain that lack of repetitive 
activity should limit the application of the fluid class recovery. 
Focusing for the moment on the illegal conduct of the defendant, 
it is clear that a remedy that requires a defendant to relinquish 
the fruits of its illegal activity has a substantial in terrorem effect.215 
When, because of the changing components of the market, a defen-
dant is permitted to engage in illegal activity without the constraint 
of a potential liability for the full amount of illegal gains, the temp-
tation to engage in such activity is strongest. In the antitrust field, 
the provision for recovery of treble damages216 and the frequent 
judicial pronouncements of the valuable service that private en-
forcement of the antitrust laws provides217 are recognition of the 
substantial value of a remedy that bears some relation to the dam-
ages suffered by the plaintiff, but also looks to the deterrent effect 
on the defendant. In other areas of the law, decidely noncompen-
satory damages may be recovered because a straight compensatory 
remedy would not act as an adequate deterrent.218 
Wide application o~ the noncompensatory principle would, how-
ever, result in an unwarranted intrusion into areas traditionally 
reserved for criminal statutes. Consumer class actions are likely to 
arise from contractual relationships, and damages should be sub-
ject to the general contractual standard of compensatory, nonpunitive 
recovery.219 It may of course be argued that a fluid class recovery 
is compensatory in the sense that the damages awarded represent 
only the amounts that will make the members of the class whole. 
But it should be clear that the distribution is punitive from the 
defendant's perspective when the repetitive level is so low that the 
persons who have suffered damages will not be the beneficiaries of 
the residual funds. To avoid this result, the requirement that a court 
find some level of repetitive activity before implementation of a 
fluid class recovery is a reasonable restraint on its utilization. 
Although it is clear that some repetitive activity should be a pre-
requisite, the difficult problem arises in attempts to determine the 
214. See text accompanying note Ill supra. 
215. See Pomerantz, supra note 172. 
216. 15 u.s.c. § 15 (1970). 
217. E.g., Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 494 (1968). 
218. See, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. 19, § 13: 
Usury-Legal Rate.-All contracts for a greater rate of interest than ten percent 
per annum shall be void, as to principal and interest, and the General Assembly 
shall prohibit the same by law; but when no rate of interest is agreed upon, the 
rate shall be six per centum per annum. · 
219. See C. McCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 81, at 286-92, § 137, 
at 560-62 (1935). 
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exact quantum of repetitive activity necessary to sustain a fluid class 
recovery scheme. Any demand for a high level of repetitive activity 
must be balanced with the realization that in many class actions 
the refusal to certify the class is tantamount to an absolute denial 
of recovery. In Eisen the court found that the number of persons 
engaging in odd-lot transactions increased by about five per cent 
in each of the two years following the period during which the al-
leged illegal differentials were charged.220 Assuming this rate of in-
crease has continued, in the five years since initiation of the suit 
the number of "new" persons entering the odd-lot market con-
stitutes twenty per cent of the present market. Such calculations 
do not take into account the cessation of odd-lot transactions by 
some members of the 1962-1966 class so that any fluid class recovery 
would benefit a large number of persons, and a substantial per-
centage of persons relative to the represented class, who did not suffer 
damages during the period of alleged illegal activities by the defen-
dants. Yet the court in Eisen concluded that the level of repetitive 
activity made a fluid class recovery possible. In contrast to Eisen, 
the court in City of Philadelphia refused to authorize a fluid class 
recovery because of a lack of repetitive activity. One of the more 
confusing statements in the opinion is the assertion that a fluid 
class recovery, which results in a windfall to some motorists, would 
constitute "a deprivation to the motorist entitled to recovery."221 
It is difficult to envision the fluid class recovery as a deprivation to 
the consumer motorist class when even the court admits that denial 
of certification will mean that none of the nongovernmental mem-
bers of the Philadelphia-New Jersey class will be able to recover 
damages. This paradox illustrates that a requirement of a strict 
level of repetitive activity decreases the opportunity to use a fluid 
class recovery, and, more importantly, results in denying recovery 
to any member of the consumer class on the ground that recovery 
by all is not possible. The court in City of Philadelphia made no 
specific findings of the degree of repetitive activity present in the 
relevant market, and therefore no quantitative comparison with 
the Eisen case is possible. But the very fact that the only alternative 
to a fluid class recovery will often be no recovery at all should per-
suade courts to avoid an unreasonably high standard for repetitive 
activity. 
3. The Fluid Class Recovery in Perspective 
The fluid class recovery does provide an alternative to the cal-
culation of individual damages in class actions, and in that sense 
220. 52 F.R.D. at 257. 
221. 53 F.R.D. at 72. 
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it dramatically reduces the drain on court resources and assists in 
the management of large consumer class actions brought under Rule 
23(b)(3). But the fluid class recovery also has limitations that, while 
not decreasing its advantages when implemented, limit the occasions 
when it will be used. These limitations arise from the nature of the 
commercial activity in which a defendant may be engaged. 
The most obvious prerequisite to implementation of a fluid class 
recovery is the calculation of gross damages. The entire concept of 
the fluid class recovery revolves around the establishment of a dam-
age fund from which payments for individual claims and litigation 
expenses are deducted. In some industries the pricing structure 
may be based on such a multitude of variables that calculation of 
gross damages is precluded because of an inability to establish an 
average margin or typical overcharge. "[T]he key to defendants' 
arguments"222 in City of Philadelphia was the complexity of the gas-
oline pricing structure. The court concluded that calculation of 
individual damages would be impossible even if gross damages 
could be established. Indeed, the complexity in pricing suggests 
that even gross damages would have been indeterminable, and such 
a finding would have precluded the application of a fluid class 
recovery. 
The requirement of a significant level of repetitive activity will 
also serve to reduce the occasions on which a fluid class recovery 
will be utilized. But the class action is itself a creature of necessity, 
and for this reason the policy of conforming to compensatory prin-
ciples of damage calculation is likely to give way to the maintenance 
of class actions in those situations where failure to allow a fluid 
class recovery denies recovery to all. 
The most serious limitation to the use of the fluid class recovery 
will arise in those cases in which the residual fund is to be returned 
to the class over a substantial period of time and the class repre-
sentative is ill equipped, and no independent regulatory agency 
exists, to supervise the return of the fund by the defendant. There 
will be times when the anticipated burden of continuing court 
responsibility in enforcement of the damage decree will dictate 
that a class action not be certified. But none of these limitations can 
detract from the contribution that the concept of a fluid class re-
covery makes to decreasing the manageability problems that would 
othenvise arise in many large consumer class actions. The strength 
of the fluid class recovery lies in the implicit recognition that class 
actions are different from the ordinary adversary proceeding and 
require innovative procedures if they are to be fully effective. 
222. 53 F.R.D. at 58. 
